Ramirez, "Institutions of the Spanish American Empire..."

Susan Elizabeth Ramírez,
“Instituions of the Spanish American Empire in the Hapsburg Era.”
In Thomas H. Holloway, ed. A Companion to Latin American History, 2008, p. 106-23. excerpted from p. 111-20.

1. List as many church duties as you can find in this article. The first are clearly to convert Native Americans and to preach, but beyond these things, what did priests do?

2. Page 2 discusses the Spanish monarchy's "patronato real" (royal patronage) of the Catholic Church.  Had you ever heard of this before? Can you figure out what this entails based on this reading?  Does it surprise you?

3. The section “State Policy” explains one of the benefits that a “citizen” (or “vecino” of a town) might have  that wouldn’t be available to those that were not recognized as such. Explain this benefit and describe some implications for colonial Latin America (social, economic, political.)

4. On p. 3, what are the diezmo, the primicia and the quinto-real?

5. In general terms, what is a corregidor?  Why would a corregidor pay the crown for the “privilege” of holding the office if the pay was not good?

6 Explain why an OIDOR and VICEROY weren’t allowed to marry anyone from the local elite (see p. 4).

7. Describe how trade (commerce) was regulated between Spain and the New World?  (Are the words almojarifazgo and averia relevant?)

8. Think about the Church’s role in the anecdote on p. 4.  For you, what light does is shed on the role of the Church in colonial Latin America?

9   Read the section called “Centralizing Ambiguities”.  Far beyond the formal role(s) of the church in colonial life, how might the Church's influence extend into politics and other areas? Why might this be so?

 10. The section “Centralizing Ambiguities” begins with the idea of “overlapping jurisdiction;” how does that relate to the activities of the church as described here?
11. On p. 7, the concept of "obedezco pero no cumplo" is introduced.  How was it possible to "OBEY BUT NOT COMPLY" with an order?   Based on the reading, why might this have been tolerated?  Do you have any other ideas about why it existed (not based on the reading)?

Vocabulary: 
Hapsburg = This was the ruling family (the monarchy) in Spain until 1700.
regular and secular clergy = The regular clergy were attached to monastic orders (like the Jesuits or the Franciscans).  As for the secular clergy, think of the definition of secular.  The secular clergy were those who lived and worked in towns and parishes (as a part of the broader secular society). Later in this article when the inquisition is discussed, the term "secular authorities" is used.  This means, a government, rather than church, official.
encomendero - a Spaniard who was given a grant of indians to "protect and convert," and who in exchange was entitled to indian tributes or labor. (The institution or practice was called the encomienda).
oidor = The title of the judges of the audiencia. (The term oidor comes from the verb oir, to listen. 
Feel free to ask about other terms (use the comment function here to post questions of this type). 

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p.2                 Church and State
...[T]he civil bureaucracy and local town councils did not govern alone. In colonial times many of the functions that are today state obligations were charged to the Church. In fact, Gibson, a very well known colonial historian, writes that, "In the complexities of law and precedent it was impossible to say' where the church authority ceased and state authority began." The Church was not a monolithic institution. It consisted of two major parts: the regular and the secular clergy. The regular clergy lived by a monastic "rule" in convents and monasteries, and 'included Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, Carmelites, Jesuits, and other orders. The secular clergy were the parish priests under bishops and archbishops. Together the seculars and regulars, as arms of the state, defined what was proper and "civilized." In so doing, they upheld European morality and championed Spanish culture. Priests also sometimes used the confessional to betray plotters of insurrection and actively neutralized social unrest. They administered charity, running orphanages and feeding the poor. The Church also established the few schools that existed: seminaries and universities for the males and convent classes for the girls. The king charged them with taking censuses and keeping the population registers, including baptismal, marriage, and death records. With no mass media and extremely limited literacy, the clergy became the means to communicate with parishioners, reading edicts and letters from the pulpit during mass. Some orders took a role in health, operating the only hospitals in urban areas. Donations, endowments, fees, and offerings allowed the Church over the years to amass great wealth. In a society without public or private banks until the eighteenth century, these pooled funds were made available as loans at 3-7 percent interest to people with real assets. Thus the Church financed investment and conspicuous consumption of the elite and, in so doing, won additional influence and power.
        Furthermore, the regular [clergy] served as a vanguard in the colonization of the Americas and played a major role in the "spiritual conquest" and the acculturation and protection of the native peoples throughout the colonial era. The Franciscans and Dominicans early became builders of missions, around which congregated the native faithful. The later-arriving, but highly organized and effective Jesuits were given the task of educating the sons of the native nobility...
        Over time, the Crown turned against the regular orders in favor of the secular clergy. The Crown, jealous of its power, controlled the secular church through the institution of the patronato real, which gave the king a veto over high ecclesiastical office and the additional power to administer ecclesiastical jurisdictions and revenues and veto papal bulls. Thus, the Crown had final say over who became archbishops and bishops, choosing one who would most likely bend to the royal will from a roster of possible nominees submitted by the Church. Over time then, some missionary regulars, once they had succeeded in baptizing, catechizing, and hispanizing their native charges, were forced to leave the monasteries they had built to start over farther and farther away from the viceregal capitals to minister to ever more remote frontier areas. By this process, the churches and missions of the regulars were transferred to the seculars and, in a sense, the missionaries were penalized for their independence and conversion successes (Gibson 1966: 76).


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P 3.       To further maintain the purity of the faith, Philip II established the Inquisition in Spanish America by decrees of 1569-70, with offices in Mexico City, Lima, and Cartagena. It was made up of a tribunal with judges or inquisitors, a lawyer and a secretary, responsible to its own supreme council in Spain. Its jurisdiction covered clerics and laymen (including blacks, but not Indians). It dealt with all offenses against the faith, such as heresy, blasphemy, sorcery, bigamy, impersonation of the priesthood, belief in false doctrine, incest, and homosexuality. Specifically outside its jurisdiction were treason, unnatural vice, rebellion, rioting and inciting to riot; forgery of royal letters; rape; arson; housebreaking; highway robbery; robbery of churches; and "other crimes greater than these." It had the power to arrest, excommunicate, incarcerate, embargo goods, fine, humiliate, and burn at the stake. These powers and its secret activities and deliberations inspired horror in the general population. There was no possibility of appeal from its decisions to any secular authority in the Indies. In general, inquisitors lost no opportunity to extend their jurisdiction. One mechanism for doing so was the practice of appointing ecclesiastical judges of the first instance (comisarios), in all important centers of population, and a network of familiares, honorary lay agents, in all towns to keep their eyes and ears open for infractions of law. Rich and powerful men desired to be familiares because of the prestige associated with the post and because service would give them exemptions (Fueros) from prosecution in civil courts (Greenleaf 1969).
       State Policy
...Royal officials took a direct role in providing the wherewithal to subsidize activities that proved beneficial to the metropolis. When the sought-after exotic spices proved illusive, the Crown focused on bullion. In theory, one-fifth (the quinto real) of the precious metal of native treasures, taken as plunder, delivered as ransom, or obtained through grave robbing, was due the king. Once the sources of these metals were determined and located, crown officials structured local institutions to subsidize mining efforts. For example, in Peru, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (ruled 1569-81) resurrected an Inca institution, called the m'ita, the Quechua term for rotating public' labor service, and reformulated it to provide thousands of native workers for the highland mines in the southern Andes .... The mines proved an effective market for the agricultural sector. Alongside native production of corn, potatoes, beans and other grains, and vegetables, Spaniards and creoles began ranching and farming activities soon after arrival. As Spanish towns were founded, citizens received garden plots in suburban areas. After the encomendero protests over the New Laws, [<-- important, but we'll explain it in class] additional towns were founded as agricultural centers. The citizens of these new towns received mercedes, large grants of land for planting wheat, sugar cane, and other cash crops, often in areas where the native population had declined due to the devastating effects of European diseases. The crown-mandated reducción or congregacion (native resettlement) policy benefited estate owners by forcing natives off good lands and concentrating them in their own towns (pueblos). These natives eventually came under the control of the corregidor, who . . . [established] the repartimiento labor distribution system mandat¬ing that a certain percentage of able-bodied, adult native males serve on a rotating basis, either as agricultural laborers or shepherds at a fixed wage usually below the market rate.
Original mercedes became in time the basis of large estates, of three major types: the estancias (ranches); the mixed farms producing cattle and agricultural products called by the generic label haciendas; and the specialized farms or plantations (...latter term was not used in colonial times), variously called haciendas y trapiches, ingenios, or some variation of the same. Periodically in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the Crown would send a high-ranking inspector to the provinces to examine land titles (visitas de la tierra). These inspections were designed to redress native grievances over land usurpation and to produce revenue for the Crown. Individuals without proper title to all the land that they claimed or used were charged a fee to legalize and regularize their titles. Inspectors sold unused public lands, the tierras realengas y baldias, to the highest bidder. Although estate owners paid no property taxes as such in this era, they did send part of the produce as the primicia (first fruits) and the diezmo (tithe) to support the church.
       Another sector regulated by the royal institutions in Spain and America was commerce, .... The Casa de Contratación... established a state trade monopoly. . .. For easier control, it limited the ports open to overseas commerce to Santo Domingo, Veracruz, Panama, Cartagena, and Lima-Callao. Trade was restricted between American ports during certain periods. Licenses were required to trade various items, the most famous of which was the asiento to trade in slaves. A fleet system was established gradually, beginning in 1526 when a decree prohibited single ships from crossing the Atlantic. In 1537, another established the armada (flota) system to protect vessels and enforce the trade monopoly.
        Taxes on this trade were sizable. The almojarifazgo, established in the sixteenth century, was an import-export duty. This tax was decreed for Peru in 1573, but because of local resistance not applied until 1591. Then it began as a 5 percent tax on all commercial goods imported into Peru and a 2 percent charge on those
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P. 4  exported. In the seventeenth century it fluctuated from 2.5 to 7.5 percent, although some foodstuffs were exempt. Originally, it was directly collected by royal officials, but after 1640 tax farmers or the merchants' guild (consulado, discussed below) made collections. Another charge was the averia, a convoy duty to support the Armada del Mar del Sur (Fleet of the South Sea). It was first instituted in the 1580s . . . after Frances Drake's 1579 raid along the west coast of South America, at the rate of 0.5 percent on all transported mer¬chandise. In 1592 this duty was increased to 1 percent after Thomas Cavendish's raid of 1587. By the 1630s, the duty had been raised to 2 percent. . . .
        Centralizing Ambiguities
Studies of how some of these governing institutions functioned found that a latent centralization of power was built into the structure. Jurisdictions were designed to be overlapping, so that conflicts between institutions and persons that could not be resolved on a local level were appealed up. The king, as the embodiment of natural and divine law, was the ultimate authority. He had the right, as the best leader, to interpret God's law or master design on earth. Viewed over the long run, the system was a brilliant mechanism for asserting royal power. This system of nebulous and loosely defined jurisdictions built centralization into a system in which the king was the ultimate judge of issues deemed important enough to require his attention.
An example of how the Hapsburg system of vague job descriptions and overlapping authorities resulted in ambiguity comes from northern Mexico in the 1950s. . . .
[Dr. Olander cut a large section here: an explanation of one particular power struggle caused by overlapping authority.  It is included as an optional section at the end of the article.]
. . .situations shifted with changing viceroys, and central authorities compromised to prevent major clashes and violence. Long delays were common. During these, each side bargained, and appealed to the king. Appeals were made to multiple authorities over the years, but the king had the last say.

Usually the viceroy did not intervene in local affairs, but a striking example of viceregal intervention occurred in 1588 over the unlawful marriage of a judge of the Audiencia of New Galicia. The case illustrates the continuing clashes between peninsular and local authority and the calming effect of the clergy. At first glance, this might seem insignificant, even trivial. Viceroys and oidores• were forbidden by a decree of 1575 - and later their children too were for¬bidden - to marry into the local elite and were automatically to be deprived of their office and salary if they did so. In 1588 Nurio Nunez de Villavicencio, a judge of the Audiencia of New Galicia, married the daughter of Juan Bautista de Lomas y Colmenares, a rancher, mine owner, and citizen of Nieves in New Galicia. It was the duty of the president of the Audiencia to deprive Nunez de Villavicencio of his position, but the presidency was vacant. None of the other judges took action against a colleague. The Viceroy Alvaro Manrique de Zuniga, Marques de Villarnanrique (1585-90), ordered Nunez de Villavicencio to be arrested and held without salary. In response the oidores declared the viceroy without jurisdiction over the population of New Galicia. An outraged viceroy wanted to reduce the tribunal to obedience by force. He ordered an army of 300 men to advance toward Guadalajara. The Audiencia, in reaction, mustered 200 vecinos and their servants, while the local natives fled to the hills and work came to a standstill. Eventually, the bishop interceded, leading a "solemn procession" with the exposed Host in his hands, and with "sermons and showers of tears" he persuaded the commander of the viceroy's army to return to Mexico and avoid civil war.
Reports reached the king, who intervened to prevent civil war by replacing the viceroy with Luis de Velasco, the younger (1590-5). In the end the new viceroy took no action, . . .[T]he struggle between viceroy and the Audiencia over a seemingly petty matter became redefined as one of major jurisdictional significance. In principle, the viceroy could intervene in the presidency of New Galicia, but in practice efforts to do so could provoke violent conflict. The king took quick and decisive action when conflict (which was expected) reached a threshold level, above which it was not tolerated. The Church, the traditional bestower of political legitimacy, intervened in a political dispute. Local defiance was tolerated to a degree, but the balance of authority was not to be destroyed.
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P. 5          In the Hapsburg governing system there were also clashes between church and state. For example, a conflict between the Audiencia of New Galicia and the Inquisition over jurisdiction occurred in the 1590s during the viceroyalty of Luis de Velasco, the younger (1590-5), who wanted to organize an expedition to settle what is now the US state of New Mexico. There were two candidates for the job, both from New Galicia: Juan Bautista de Lomas y Colmenares of the town of Nieves, reputed to be the richest man in New Galicia with considerable family influence; and Francisco de Urdiñola, a Basque who had come to the Indies as a "poor gentleman," but who had acquired considerable wealth as a rancher and mine owner. Urdiñola was known as an able soldier and organizer, having settled New León (Coahuila) and founded the city of Saltillo. The incident started in February of 1593 when Urdiñola's wife died. Six months later Domingo de Landaverde, a Spaniard employed by Urdiñola as a mechanic and handyman, disappeared. An official inquiry discovered nothing and the case was closed. After the incident, Urdiñola was summoned to Mexico City to talk with Viceroy Velasco about the expedition ... into New Mexico. The Crown had rejected Lomas y Colmenares' proposal because he wanted powers and conditions that were deemed "outrageous." Urdiñola's appointment was almost certain. But, the proceedings were interrupted by an order for his arrest on a charge of murder, issued by the Audiencia of New Galicia.
        The Audiencia's case resulted from an anonymous and undated denunciation accusing Urdiñola of poisoning his wife and murdering his employee Landaverde, alleging adultery as the motive. This action was taken after the son-in-law of Lomas y Colmenares, Urdiñola's rival, became a judge of the Audiencia of New Galicia. The Audiencia sent a judge to Nieves to arrest Urdiñola, his steward, and younger brother and sequester his property. But Urdiñola was in Mexico City and the younger brother and steward were absent. Urdiñola appealed to the viceroy who dispatched a letter to the Audiencia, requesting that the trial be removed to Mexico City. The Audiencia refused. Then Urdiñola, as a familiar [a lay assistant to the inquisition], sought protection of the Inquisition, which took fast action. The next day it sent an order to the Audiencia demanding jurisdiction and that Urdiñola's property be released. The Inquisition also asked civil authorities to keep Urdiñola in Mexico City, safe from arrest by the Audiencia. The Audiencia replied that the Inquisition did not have jurisdiction in cases of murder. The Inquisition replied with a threat to excommunicate and fine the judges and their agents. This impasse forced the parties to negotiate the jurisdiction according to a decree of 1572 that provided that in cases of conflict over criminal jurisdiction, the senior judge of the Audiencia should confer with two Inquisitors. If agreement could not be reached the parties were to send the case to Spain, where the Suprema of the Inquisition and Council of the Indies would decide it. Meanwhile, the accused was to be released on bond. •
The Audiencia sent an agent, not a judge, so the Inquisitors paid no heed. Finally in May of 1595, a judge arrived in Mexico City. Eventually, the Audiencia and the Inquisition both sent agents to Nieves to hear witnesses. The Inquisition inquiry reported that there was no case against Urdiñola and that he had been framed at the instigation of Lomas y Colmenares to get Urdiñola out of the way so that he would be commissioned to lead the expedition into New Mexico. The case was appealed to Spain where it was decided according to strict law in favor of the Audiencia. Urdiñola was tried in Guadalajara, but the composition of the court had changed. The judgment in the case, given in 1598, found Urdiñola an accessory to the death of Landaverde. Urdiñola appealed to Mexico City and, there, was found innocent. Thus, the Church, specifically in this case the Inquisition, had power and would protect its own (here, a familiar) in disputes over jurisdiction. The conflict expanded and spread upward; a personal dispute became an institutional one. Institutions bargained and negotiated; appeals limited conflict. Yet, as in the cases above, the central power resolved the dispute in the end.
These cases illustrate the general truth that while central power managed to main¬tain overall authority it was not absolute, nor could it be, considering the size of the Spanish Empire, the vast distances, and the difficulty of communication and control.
Corrupting Contradictions
Contradictions within the system of governance• also made practice different than what was expected in principle. For example, the restrictions on local corregidores, who over time became overwhelmingly creoles, were numerous. A man could not be a corregidor in his native region. He was not supposed to hold significant property in the area in which he held office. He was not supposed to be a relative of another office holder. He could not marry a woman under his jurisdiction. The term of office of five years was supposed to prevent him from establishing an entrenched local base of support. Before taking office he had to submit an inventory of his property and personal effects. And he had to secure a bond to guarantee his honesty in handling tribute and taxes and the administration of justice. But because a candidate usually turned to the
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P. 6  local elite, be it made up of encomenderos, landowners, miners, merchants, or some combination of these, to put up his bond, he became beholden to them. This made complete impartiality in settling court cases sometimes impossible. When he left town to visit the people under his jurisdiction, for example, he left a lieutenant in his place, occasionally one of his guarantors, who used the delegated power to settle court cases in his own or his kinsmen's or client's interests.
        In the seventeenth century, the corregidor also had to buy his office. Because the state salary was low, the corregidor had to find other ways to recoup the expenditure and otherwise benefit from his office. Thus his interests were financial, as well as administrative. Corregidores of Indians forced natives to buy sometimes non-essential goods, like mules, mirrors, and wine at high and inflated prices. In some areas, too, the corregidor distributed to natives such raw materials as cotton or wool, to spin and weave into cloth, in a rudimentary system reminiscent of the putting-out system of Europe. The corregidor then sold the resulting cloth at a profit.
        At the end of the corregidor's term, he was required to stand for a review (residencia) of his administration, designed to investigate and determine if he had misappropriated funds or abused his power. These proceedings proved moderately effective in the sixteenth century, but over the course of the seventeenth century most became increasingly procedural and ineffective. This was due to the fact that local members of the elite put up the bond to guarantee that the incoming royal official would remain for the official inquiry into his tenure. When the time came, however, these same guarantors had no incentive for denouncing abuses, because they were ultimately responsible for paying any fines incurred for infractions. Secondly, the announcements of the proceedings were made in Spanish by the public crier, thereby leaving natives who did not know the language uninformed of the proceedings. Finally, in these residencias the judge might be - and often was - the incoming royal official, who knew that he too would be subject to the same kind of hearing at the end of his term. This made him sympathetic to his predecessor and may have led to the whitewashing of misdeeds. Only if the abuse was egregious would fines be levied. These contradictions in the system allowed laws to be inconsistently obeyed or implemented, especially at the local level. These same regulations and the poor pay of most positions, in a social atmosphere that pressured officials to live ostentatiously, motivated most to ease their monetary worries by finding ways to get around them . . . in the spirit of "hecho la ley, hecho la trampa" (a law passed begets a trick to bypass it). For instance, the same types of financial pressures experienced by the corregidor also subverted his supervisors and the entire hierarchy of royal officials. Thus, the first viceroy of New Spain, Antonio de Mendoza (1535-50):

in his person and as the monarch's surrogate presented a far more resplendent and impressive symbol of royal, indeed imperial, authority. He belonged to one of the five or six most powerful and prestigious families in Castile. He came of a functioning aristocracy, active in military leadership, civil administration, and the church hierarchy, wealthy in lands and livestock, and responsible in royal service. He was a younger son of Don Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla and Marquis of Mondejar, the first Christian governor of Granada. . . . In New Spain Mendoza maintained a court, a bodyguard of thirty to forty gentle¬men, and a staff of sixty Indians, and employed many more. As viceroy he was also president of the audiencia of Mexico, vice-patron of the church, and prime dispenser of patronage. He could and did frame laws, subject to review by the Council of the Indies. He ruled as father to the Indians, governor and mediator among Spaniards, and lesser version of the king (Liss 1975: 56-7).

Although he himself may have obeyed the rules, they did not prevent other members of his immediate family from breaking them with his help.

From his arrival in New Spain Mendoza had complained of inadequate salary.    Apparently, however, he soon found extra official means to sustain himself and his family. His brother Francisco had accompanied him to Mexico and became one of its principal wealthy vecinos, marrying the widow of Juan Jaramillo, whose first wife had been Marina [Malinche], Hernan Cortes' native translator, confidante, and the mother of his bastard son, Martín. In 1556 Velasco's son Luis, later to be viceroy also, married Maria de Ircio y Mendoza, the Mexican-born daughter of Mendoza's sister Leonor and Marrin de Ircio, and his daughter Ana de Castillo wed the mine-rich conqueror of Nueva Vizcaya, Diego de Ibarra. The second viceroy and his family, too, despite royal orders to the contrary, became actively involved in the economy and society of Mexico (Liss 1975: 65).

        Stephanie Blank and Clara López Beltran have documented social networks that operated in a similar fashion in colonial Venezuela and Bolivia, respectively.
Other royal officials were subject to many of the same prohibitions as the corregidor, like not marrying, holding property, or profiting locally. But colonial manuscripts document how such legislation remained often a dead letter. In the 1540s, the oidor [audiencia judge] Lorenzo de Tejada was denounced for trading with the Indians. He exchanged bad land for twice as much good land and bought property which he improved and built upon for very profitable resale. And, in 1554, some oidores in New Galicia were known to be active in slaving,
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P. 7  in mining in Zacatecas, and in related• commerce. Luckily, the natives produced enough to satisfy the graft and exigencies of officials all the way up to the vice-king (Liss 1975: '66).
Like royal officials, colonists at all levels developed mechanisms to thwart effective central control. One of these was a studied non-observance of royal decrees. Early in the history of Spanish America, local authorities used the phrase "obedezco pero no cumplo" (I obey, but will not comply) to delay or forego the implementation of certain royal proclamations that conflicted with local interests or did not fit local circumstances. In the classical case, an alcalde would read the decree aloud, at a cabildo meeting, for example; hold it over his head; and pronounce the words "obedezco pero no cumplo,” indicating that he recognized the Crown’s authority to issue the decree but would not enforce it because it did not fit provincial conditions. While he then penned a reply to the Crown explaining his actions. . . Often, years passed before a reply came from Spain. Meanwhile the decree was ignored and largely forgotten.
        An example of such resistance and effective local autonomy comes from the municipal level where the town council (cabildo) represented the power and authority of the local elite. In a climate of serious financial exigencies after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Crown tried to impose a special tax to sponsor and arm an American fleet-Town councils became a lobbying force against the tax. The cabildo of the highland city of Quito invoked the "obedezco peru no cumplo" tradition and asked for a suspension, arguing that they were already paying a subsidy to fortify the seaport of Guayaquil. Behind. some of the resistance was the thought that the fleet was a mechanism shutting them off from a freer international trade that might have lowered the costs of imported goods.. . . Eventually, the president of the Audiencia, Dr. Manuel•Barros de San Millin, jailed a member of the cabildo. When the vecinos let him out of jail, Barros de San Millan requested military backup from Lima. A few days after Christmas of 1592, fighting broke out. The viceroy of Lima, Garda Hurtado de Mendoza (1589- 96), had dispatched troops and, in response, the vecinos had called up a voluntary militia and begun to talk about independence with the support of England. In the insurrection that followed, a sniper shot a leading citizen and a priest mediated to stop a mob of citizens from attacking the audiencia president. Eventually, in 1593, 'the Crown sent an independent royal agent to mediate, investigate, and review the situation. He imposed the tax, but dismissed Barros de San Millan because he had not sought a compromise. In the end the Crown won (Pareja Diezcanseco 1958: 269-75). Thereafter, the cabildo as an institution lost power to the corregidor and viceroy. The Crown began to sell cabildo offices to men who had a stake in the system and therefore would not challenge and change it. The signs of decline of the cabildo are seen in the infrequency of meetings and the refusal to serve, especially in smaller towns. In the seventeenth century, municipalities sold off public lands, depriving them of a source of income. They became dependent on the viceroy for money. The scope of their activities declined and they often let crown-appointed corregidores take over some of their functions.
When a legal way could not be invented around a law or regulation, people resorted to corruption. The trade monopoly, heavy taxation, and mercantilist trade and production restrictions encouraged contraband. To escape paying the royal fifth, Potosi miners sent part of their silver down the river system to the south Atlantic coast to exchange for imports of English manufactured goods and French luxury items. In mid-seventeenth century Peru the sale of fiscal offices to inefficient and dishonest officials "with strong local connections" institutionalized "venality and corruption," negatively affecting royal tax collection efforts. Twenty or twenty-five years later a crown investigator described the Supreme Court judge Bartolome Salazar as a "dangerous and greedy man, who used his position to build a personal fortune of over 10,000,000 pesos.”


OPTIONAL READING:

BELOW IS THE SECTION THAT I CUT FROM THE ARTICLE in Centralizing ambiguities section) :
An example of how the Hapsburg system of vague job descriptions and overlap¬ping authorities resulted in ambiguity and conflict comes from northern Mexico in the 1560s (Parry 1948: 89-90). The Audiencia of New Galicia was a presidency at the time under the authority of Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1550-64). There was no governor, only an Audiencia in Guadalajara. When the viceroy ordered the Audiencia to send someone to protect the scattered Spanish settlements in the north against the intermittent warfare of native Chichimecs, Guachichiles, and Zacatecos, the judges of the Audiencia came into conflict with prominent personages of the region and then with the viceroy himself. The viceroy deemed security essential to provide the conditions to encourage mining, ranching, and other productive activities.
'When the first commissioner, Pedro de Ahumada, proved ineffective, the viceroy became convinced that other measures were necessary to maintain order. Therefore, in 1562 Velasco appointed Francisco de Ibarra to be the governor of New Vizcaya, a new jurisdiction farther north. Ibarra was a nephew of one of the first conquerors, Diego de Ibarra, who had powerful connections at court. Diego had used his influence with the viceroy to get Francisco accepted as a page in the viceroy's service in
INSTITUTIONS OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN EMPIRE p. 115
1550, and in 1554 Francisco got a commission to explore the north. He became the leader of a group that founded the settlements of San Martin, Fresnillo, Sombrerete, and Nieves. It was unsurprising then that in 1562 he was chosen as governor in return for promising to assume the expenses of pacification and settlement.
Conflict erupted because the Audiencia of New Galicia already claimed jurisdiction and had chosen men to head some towns in the area. One was Diego Garcia de Colio, who "was a tough old conquistador, who had been at the taking of Mexico [Tenochtitlan] and had served subsequently in Guatemala, and under Francisco Cortes in Chimalhuacan, He was a vecino of Guadalajara, a person of considerable social influence in New Galicia" (Parry 1948: 89-90). When Francisco de Ibarra appeared in the town of San Martin and asserted his authority as governor of New Vizcaya, Garcia de Colio resisted. An angry scene ensued during which Garcia de Colio was injured. Ibarra then expelled him and other municipal officials, refounded the town, and left. After his departure, Garcia de Colio reestablished the jurisdiction of the Audiencia and sent an angry letter of complaint and protest to the king. Meanwhile, Ibarra set up his headquarters in Durango and from there started to extend his jurisdiction toward the Pacific Ocean. The Audiencia of Guadalajara objected. In 1564 Viceroy Velasco died, leaving the viceregal throne empty. The Audiencia of New Galicia appealed to King Philip II, because no favorable decision could be expected from the Audiencia of New Spain in Mexico City. The Audiencia of New Galicia claimed that some towns had been founded before Ibarra arrived and therefore were under its jurisdiction; that it had authority over the population of what was becoming New Vizcaya; and that appeals should be heard by its judges. Ibarra replied that he recognized only the viceregal and audiencia authority in Mexico City. He also said in his defense that the whole dispute resulted from jealousy because the oidores could not do what he was doing. He saw his actions as service to the crown.
The new viceroy, Gast6n de Peralta, the Marques de Falces (1566-7), supported Ibarra, because by granting him jurisdiction he recognized his own authority over the northern settlers. The Audiencia of New Galicia protested again. A 1567 compromise halted the dispute and potential violence temporarily by giving the Audiencia of New Galicia appellate jurisdiction. The judges, however, were still not totally satis-fied. They decided to bide their time, hoping that the next viceroy would reverse the order. In 1569 Ibarra asserted his legal victories and marched into the town of Nombre de Dios, where he deposed the officials appointed by the Audiencia. An armed clash was avoided only because the Viceroy Martin Enriquez de Almansa took complete control of the town. In 1576 Philip II ruled (on appeal) that the town was part of New Vizcaya. Thus, the ultimate authority, the Crown, vindicated the vice¬regal decisionsand authority. But this occurred only after the struggle between Ibarra and the Audiencia of New Galicia was redefined by the Viceroy and the Audiencia of Mexico City; situations shifted with changing viceroys, and central authorities compromised to prevent major clashes and violence. Long delays were common. During these, each side bargained, and appealed to the king. Appeals were made to multiple authorities over the years, but the king had the last say.